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REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
IN TRANSPORT: ALL IN ONE BASKET?
Nicholas Rivers† and Randall Wigle‡
SUMMARY 
Analysis after analysis has shown consistently that if policy-makers aiming to 
meet climate goals are looking for the most-efficient, least-distortionary way 
to target emissions growth, there is simply nothing better than abandoning all 
emissions regulations except for one: A straight, revenue-neutral carbon tax. 
Nothing works through more channels, at a lower cost. 
Alas, policy-makers are not always looking for the most-efficient, least-
distortionary way to target emissions growth. That’s because many of those 
same analyses show that in order to reach emissions targets, the price on 
carbon would have to be so punitive as to be politically unbearable, raising the 
price of gasoline, for example, by about a dollar a litre. That leads politicians to 
mix in other policies that are less visible to the consumer but also less efficient, 
less effective and more expensive in abating carbon dioxide. 
The recently negotiated Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change intends to follow that model, relying on a blend of different 
policies to help reach Canada’s Paris climate targets. But while the government 
seems therefore determined to rule out the possibility of a nothing-but-a-
carbon-tax plan, it is possible, through the careful application of just the right 
sort of emission-reduction approaches, to reduce the costs of abatement in 
a key policy target — namely, road transportation — to a level that at least 
approaches the lower cost of a carbon tax.  
The government will likely consider several options in trying to reduce emissions 
from road transportation. Typical tools include requiring manufacturers to 
meet standards for new vehicles that mandate fuel economy and greenhouse 
gas emissions; gasoline taxes; taxes on emissions-intensive vehicles; subsidies 
† 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and Institute of the Environment, University of Ottawa. email: nrivers@uottawa.ca.
‡ 
Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Department of Economics Lazaridis School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier 
University (on sabbatical at School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University U.K.). e-mail: rwigle@wlu.ca.
1for low-emission or zero-emission vehicles; and subsidies for public transit. Indications 
are that a low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) will play a significant role in the Pan-
Canadian Framework. 
Applied carefully, an LCFS combined with a mandate for automakers to sell more electric 
vehicles would be an appropriate policy for Canada to achieve meaningful emissions 
reductions at a tolerable cost, given other policy measures already committed to. 
Subsidies for electric vehicles, however, should be avoided as they turn out to be one 
of the least cost-effective policies to reduce emissions. 
Requiring car makers to sell more electric vehicles will lead to higher prices for standard 
internal-combustion vehicles as automakers are forced to spread the cost of the electric-
vehicle mandate across their non-electric models. That in turn will lead to cheaper 
electric cars and pricier non-electric cars, making it likelier that consumers will gravitate 
in increasing numbers to electric cars, helping reduce emissions. Meanwhile, as the LFCS 
standard is raised, drivers of internal-combustion vehicles will face an even higher cost 
of filling up, again prompting more drivers to consider switching to electric vehicles. 
The combined effect — achievable at close to the cost of a carbon tax — will make it 
more expensive to drive a gasoline-powered car, similar to the effect of a carbon tax on 
drivers, but less visible and so less politically risky.
21. INTRODUCTION
Passenger on-road transport emissions, primarily associated with driving cars and light trucks, 
make up a significant share of all greenhouse gas emissions in Canada. The transport sector 
is also one of the most visible sources of emissions, since most Canadians regularly travel by 
vehicle. Moreover, in addition to producing greenhouse gas emissions, private vehicles generate 
a number of other social costs, including accidents, congestion and local air pollution (Parry and 
Small, 2005). As a result, provincial and federal governments in Canada have targeted passenger 
vehicles with a large number of different types of policies. For example, governments have 
used fuel economy standards and greenhouse gas intensity standards for new vehicles, gasoline 
taxes, taxes and subsidies on new vehicles, support for public transit and other policies aimed at 
reducing emissions from the passenger transport sector. Under the newly negotiated Pan-Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, several new policies are likely to be added 
to this list. Three are particularly prominent: a carbon price, to be imposed by provinces and 
backstopped by the federal government; a clean fuel standard; and an electric vehicle strategy.1
This policy brief summarizes the results of a related working paper,2 in which we consider the 
cost-effectiveness of these and other policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
the transport sector. The working paper describes a new economic model focused on the Canadian 
passenger-transport sector that we use to assess alternative policies for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport. A key feature of the model is its general equilibrium in nature, meaning 
the model allows us to consider – in a simple manner – the way in which policies in the transport 
sector interact with taxes and other policies already in place in the broader economy. In addition, 
because the model follows a standard microeconomic framework, it allows us to estimate the cost 
of alternative policies using a widely accepted framework.
FIGURE 1
Average cost for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 9.1 per cent relative to business as usual with 
alternative individual policies. The costs reflect a medium-run (roughly seven-year) time horizon.
 
1 
The Pan-Canadian Framework (http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.828774/publication.html) outlines four potential actions 
in addition to carbon pricing to reduce emissions from the transport sector (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
2016). We focus on the zero emission vehicle strategy and the clean fuel standard, which have received the most attention. 
At the time of writing, both policies remain under development, such that details are not available.
2 
Rivers, N. and R. Wigle, 2018, “An Evaluation of Policy Options for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Passenger 
Transport Sector: The Cost-Effectiveness of Regulations versus Emissions Pricing,” LCERPA Working Paper 2018-1  
(http://www.lcerpa.org/public/papers/LCERPA_2018_1.pdf).
3As expected, we find that a carbon tax is a much more cost-effective approach for reducing 
emissions compared to other policies, including a fuel economy regulation, clean fuel standard or 
zero emission vehicle mandate. Whereas the average cost of emissions reductions achieved under 
a carbon tax without revenue recycling is $113 per tonne to reduce emissions by 9.1 per cent, the 
average cost for a clean fuel standard or zero emission vehicle mandate that reduce emissions by 
the same quantity are all between $199 and $806 per tonne (as shown in Figure 1).3 Moreover, 
the average cost for a carbon tax can be substantially reduced if it is made revenue-neutral, 
such that revenues from the carbon tax are used to reduce other taxes. In this case, our analysis 
suggests that the average cost of emission reductions falls to $76 per tonne or emissions reduced 
(to reduce emissions by 9.1 per cent over about seven years). The carbon tax emerges as the most 
cost-effective policy because it takes advantage of the maximum number of channels to reduce 
emissions. The carbon tax provides incentives to travel less, to switch modes from private car to 
other less greenhouse gas-intensive modes, to use lower carbon fuels and to buy more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. None of the other policy instruments provides all those incentives.
The economic advantage of carbon taxes relative to other policies has been well known for some 
time (Keohane and Olmstead, 2016), and so our first findings are not surprising. Despite their clear 
economic advantages, however, it is politically difficult to impose high carbon taxes. Policy-makers 
instead often turn to other regulations which may be less politically controversial. In practice, 
policy-makers typically impose multiple regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – this 
is the approach the federal government proposes. The advantage of multiple regulations over 
individual regulations is that they can target more margins for reducing greenhouse gases than 
individual regulations, and so better approach the cost-effectiveness of a carbon tax.
Our research question focuses on how government should design its forthcoming package of 
regulations to be as cost-effective as possible. We consider in particular the two components 
of the Pan-Canadian Framework that are still being designed – the forthcoming zero emission 
vehicle policy and clean fuel standard – and assume that the approach to carbon pricing and 
vehicle fuel efficiency regulations are fixed. We find that there is a role for both the clean fuel 
standard as well as the zero emission vehicle standard in reducing emissions, and that when they 
are used together, they achieve substantially improved cost-effectiveness compared to when either 
instrument is imposed on its own. Our model suggests that to be as cost-effective as possible, most 
of the abatement required for most reduction targets should come from the clean fuel standard, 
but we find that a modest zero emission vehicle mandate is a recommended part of the package, 
particularly when the reduction target is tighter. For example, to achieve a further eight per cent 
reduction in passenger transport emissions beyond the effect of the announced changes in carbon 
pricing and fuel economy regulations, a low carbon fuel standard that requires a 4.3 per cent 
reduction in the emissions intensity of fuels coupled with a requirement that three per cent of new 
vehicle sales are zero emission reduces emissions relatively cost-effectively. For a more stringent 
approach, a 7.3 per cent reduction in emissions intensity of fuels (via a clean fuel standard) coupled 
with a 5.2 per cent zero emission vehicle mandate also reduces emissions relatively cost-effectively 
(albeit, still at a higher cost than a carbon tax). This combination would reduce emissions a further 
12 per cent beyond already announced measures.
3 
This measure of cost captures the change in welfare associated with each policy, both as a result of changes in behaviour as 
well as costs of new technologies. Importantly, the measure only captures costs of reducing emissions, and not the benefit 
associated with reduced emissions (which is the same across all policies we compare).
4The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we outline key trends in greenhouse 
gas emissions in the passenger-transport sector. This helps to convey the magnitude of the 
challenge facing policy-makers in generating deep greenhouse gas reductions. In Section 3 we very 
briefly describe the model used and go through the key results of the analysis. Finally, in Section 4 
we provide a discussion of the policy relevance of our findings. The accompanying technical paper 
provides a much more complete description of the analysis and results.
2. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM PASSENGER TRANSPORT
Greenhouse gas emissions from on-road passenger transport reached about 75 Mt CO2e in 2014, 
representing about 11 per cent of total emissions in Canada.4 Greenhouse gas emissions from this 
sector have grown by about 10 per cent between 1990 and 2014. However, encouragingly, emissions 
have been stable in the sector since about 2002 (see Figure 2).
Despite some progress in stabilizing emissions over the past decade in the sector, to achieve 
substantial reductions in emissions it will be necessary to significantly accelerate efforts. There are 
four key ways that decarbonization can take place in this sector: through improvements in vehicle 
fuel economy, through an increase the share of (low carbon) public and active transport, through 
reductions in the greenhouse gas intensity of fuel, and/or by reducing overall travel demand. Figure 
2 shows that since 1990, vehicle fuel economy, the greenhouse gas intensity of fuel and the share of 
low carbon travel have all improved, while travel demand has increased. These trends have resulted 
in an increase in absolute greenhouse gas emissions from passenger transport, but a decline in per 
capita emissions.
Canada’s Paris commitment requires a 30 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative 
to 2005 levels by 2030. GHG emissions from on-road passenger transport in 2014 were about 1.5 
per cent below 2005 levels, such that they must fall by roughly two per cent per year until 2030 
to hit the Paris target.5 Given an ongoing increase in population of over one per cent per year, the 
reduction in per capita GHGs from transport will need to reach roughly three per cent per year. For 
reference, the reduction in per capita GHG emissions since 2005 – a period of rising oil prices and 
the introduction of new vehicle
4 
Natural Resources Canada, Comprehensive Energy Use Database. These figures only include emissions released by 
combustion in the transport sector, and do not include the upstream emissions required to produce fuel. We do include 
upstream emissions in the model that is described later in this report. Including upstream emissions increases total transport 
sector emissions to about 86 Mt CO2e.
5 
The Paris target applies to total emissions, not to emissions from on-road transportation specifically, but this still provides a 
useful benchmark for analysis.
5FIGURE 2
Decomposition of on-road private vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. Calculations by authors  
using data from CANSIM 0051-0001 and Natural Resources Canada’s Comprehensive Energy  
Use Database.
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greenhouse gas regulations – was only about one per cent per year (shown by the dashed line in 
Figure 2). This highlights the need for aggressive policies to substantially reduce GHG emissions 
from passenger transport.
2.1 Policy options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
Governments have a wide range of policies at their disposal for addressing greenhouse gas 
emissions from passenger vehicles, and governments in Canada have been relatively pro-active 
in experimenting with these. However, there remain many policy options in the transport sector 
that Canadian governments have not used extensively, notably including distance-based taxes or 
charges and congestion charges. Our analysis does not include policies designed to address urban 
form. In our related working paper, we outline the model that we use to simulate these various 
policies. Here, we provide a brief description of the experience in Canada with these policies.
Carbon tax 
A tax (or price) on carbon dioxide emissions provides a market-based incentive that can help to 
induce emitters to account for the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions in making transport 
decisions. It is possible for revenue from a carbon tax to be used to reduce other taxes in the 
economy, provide offsetting rebates to low-income or other households, or increase investment in 
low carbon infrastructure. Carbon prices have been applied on transport fuels in British Columbia, 
6Alberta, Ontario and Quebec. The Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change stipulates that all 
provinces must have carbon prices in place by 2018, increasing from $10/t CO2e to $50/t by 2022.
6 
Fuel tax 
Fuel excise taxes have been applied in Canada (and other countries) at the provincial, municipal and 
federal levels for several decades. They have typically been implemented as a revenue generation 
tool, but because the consumption of gasoline is closely tied to greenhouse gas emissions as well as 
a number of other social costs (accidents, congestion) they can play a role in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.
Low carbon (clean) fuel standard/renewable fuel standard 
Governments across Canada, at both the federal and provincial levels, have implemented renewable 
fuel standards to promote the blending of renewable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel into 
gasoline and diesel, respectively. Renewable fuel standards specify a minimum proportion of 
renewable fuels to be included in overall fuel sales. A closely related policy is the low carbon fuel 
standard or LCFS, which has been implemented in British Columbia (as well as California). A 
low carbon fuel standard specifies a maximum life cycle emissions level for the overall fuel mix. 
The Pan-Canadian Framework envisions a low carbon fuel standard playing a significant role in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector.7 
Fuel economy regulations 
The federal government has used fuel economy and greenhouse gas intensity regulations to help 
reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles for several decades. 
These regulations can be effective in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of new 
vehicles, but do not affect the older vehicle stock, and do not provide incentives to reduce driving 
or choose lower carbon fuels. The existing passenger vehicle greenhouse gas intensity standards 
are indexed to vehicle size (i.e., become less stringent for larger footprint vehicles), which implicitly 
provides a subsidy for larger cars. This may render the policy less cost-effective in reducing 
emissions.
Electric vehicle subsidies 
For several years, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have offered large subsidies to stimulate 
the purchase of electric vehicles. Consumers appear to have responded to these policies, with 
electric vehicle market shares in these provinces substantially above those of other provinces.8 
Electric vehicle subsidies promote low carbon vehicle technology, but do not induce consumers to 
reduce driving or switch modes.
6 
Details of the carbon price are provided in the Technical Paper from Environment and Climate Change Canada (2017) 
(https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/20170518-2-en.pdf).
7 
Discussions are currently underway regarding the potential design of this policy. See the Environment Canada Discussion 
Paper (https://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe-cepa/default.asp?lang=En&n=D7C913BB-1) for details.
8 
Electric vehicle sales in 2016 made up 0.7 per cent of total vehicle sales in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, but only 
0.1 per cent of sales in other provinces.
7Zero emission vehicle regulations 
Quebec has recently implemented a zero emission vehicle mandate, which requires that zero 
emission vehicles make up a given percentage of new vehicle sales by 2025. Quebec’s policy is 
modelled on a similar policy in California. The federal government has announced the development 
of an electric vehicle strategy, which could take the form of a zero emission vehicle mandate.
2.2 Cost-effectiveness
To consider the cost-effectiveness of these various policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from the transport sector, it is useful to consider the four possible pathways by which greenhouse 
gas emissions can be reduced: by reducing overall travel demand, promoting mode switching from 
private transport to public transport (or other lower carbon transport options such as walking and 
cycling), improving fuel economy and decarbonizing transport fuels. Each of these decarbonization 
options has associated costs, and the marginal costs of actions in each of these categories are likely 
to rise as the reduction target rises.
The direct incentives that each type of public policy generates are summarized in Table 1. As 
stated above, a carbon tax – by increasing the price associated with carbon emissions – provides 
incentives for decarbonization across all four potential actions. A fuel tax is similar, but provides 
fewer incentives for decarbonizing fuels, since in Canada excise taxes generally do not differentiate 
between renewable fuels and gasoline (when the two are blended). Fuel economy regulations 
require manufacturers to improve new vehicle fuel economy, but may actually cause increases 
in travel demand, as more fuel-efficient vehicles are cheaper to drive. Similar incentives are 
generated by a low-emission vehicle mandate or by subsidies on low-emission vehicles. A low 
carbon fuel standard requires improvements in the greenhouse gas intensity of fuels. If this 
requirement indirectly causes increases in fuel prices, this policy can have indirect effects on other 
decarbonization actions.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, unless there are significant indirect 
effects caused by any of these individual policy options, pursuing deep decarbonization with any 
other single measure than a carbon tax is likely to be relatively expensive. This is true because 
other measures rely on a limited number of abatement channels, with the result that the ones 
they choose are likely to eventually become expensive. Second, although individual policies do 
not provide incentives across all decarbonization pathways in the same way as a carbon tax, it 
may be possible to implement combinations of policies that do. For example, from Table 1, it is 
apparent that a fuel tax and a low carbon fuel standard provide incentives across the range of 
decarbonization actions. A carefully chosen combination of these two policies is therefore likely to 
approximate the cost-effectiveness of a carbon tax.
8TABLE 1 DIRECT INCENTIVES TO REDUCE TRANSPORT GHG EMISSIONS GENERATED BY ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Policy
Reduce
travel
demand
Induce
mode
switching
Improve
fuel
economy
Decarbonize
Fuels
Carbon tax yes yes yes yes
Fuel tax yes yes yes noa
Fuel economy regulations no no yesb no
Electric vehicle mandate no no yes no
Low carbon fuel standard no no no yes
Public transit subsidies no yes no no
a  A fuel excise tax provides incentives for consumers to switch from fuels to electricity, but not from one liquid fuel  
to another.
b Fuel economy regulations require improvements in the new vehicle fleet, but not in existing vehicles.
3. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
We use a general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy to simulate the impacts of various 
policy options in road passenger transportation. The model9 is calibrated to reflect decisions on 
roughly a seven-year time horizon. Over this time period, approximately half of the vehicle stock 
is chosen under the new policies, and half is chosen prior to the introduction of the new policies. 
Model parameters are chosen to replicate as best as possible the key transportation-related choices 
we flagged in Table 1.
As well as comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches to reducing 
emissions – such as a clean fuel standard or a zero emission vehicle standard – with market-based 
approaches, such as a carbon tax, we also attempt to provide some insight into the current policy 
choice confronting federal policy-makers in Canada. In particular, Canada has already committed 
to a carbon-pricing strategy and has recently implemented vehicle greenhouse gas intensity 
standards. It is currently in the process of designing a clean fuel standard and an electric vehicle 
strategy. We thus focus our attention on the optimal combined choice of these latter two policies, 
and consider the cost-effectiveness of this combined package of transport sector policies.
3.1 Individual policies
We begin by comparing the cost-effectiveness of individual policies aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from passenger transport. We use the model to calculate the economic cost, 
measured as the value of lost consumption, associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
using each policy. We gradually increase the stringency of each policy in our model, which 
allows us to measure the marginal change in cost associated with a small increase in stringency 
of each policy. In Figure 3, we then compare the marginal abatement cost imposed by each of the 
individual policies that we simulate.
For virtually all greenhouse gas abatement targets, the revenue-neutral carbon tax, in which 
revenue from the carbon tax is used to reduce other tax rates in the economy, is the most cost-
effective policy. This is an anticipated result, given the structure of our model. Our calculations 
suggest that to reduce emissions from on-road passenger transportation by about five Mt CO2e per 
year within seven years would require a carbon tax of about $85/t CO2e. On its own, the $50/t tax 
9 
Further details of the model are available in a related working paper.
9agreed upon in the Pan-Canadian Framework is likely to reduce emissions by two to three Mt CO2e 
per year in the near term. The model suggests that significant emission cuts from on-road transport 
over a seven-year period would require a high carbon tax. For example, cutting emissions from 
the sector by 20 per cent over five years could require a carbon tax over $400/t CO2e or more (for 
reference, a $400/t CO2e tax would add $1/L to the price of gasoline).
While the revenue-neutral gasoline tax and carbon tax impose similar costs at modest abatement 
targets, for more stringent emissions abatement goals the revenue-neutral carbon tax becomes 
progressively more cost-effective. This occurs because it encourages the substitution of low carbon 
liquid fuels for gasoline, which is not facilitated by the gasoline tax.
We simulate two variants of the carbon tax and gasoline tax: a revenue-neutral version and a non-
revenue-neutral version. The revenue-neutral version uses the revenue from the environmental tax 
to reduce the pre-existing tax on income. The “standard” version rebates revenue to households 
directly, without changing pre-existing tax rates. Consistent with other analyses, we find that the 
revenue-neutral approach reduces the cost of achieving an environmental goal. However, both the 
revenue-neutral and standard tax policies induce greenhouse gas abatement in a much more cost-
effective manner than other individual policies, especially for more stringent environmental targets.
Among policies other than the carbon tax, those targeting electric vehicles stand out as being 
particularly costly. Electric vehicle subsidies, in particular, achieve little reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions in our model, and do so at a high cost. This outcome occurs because electric vehicle 
subsidies only affect one margin in the model – providing incentive for consumers to switch from 
internal combustion to electric vehicles. The narrow base makes this policy approach costly. 
Moreover, because they subsidize transport activities, they encourage additional transport demand, 
which works against the main objective of the policy. The EV mandate is somewhat more cost-
effective than the EV subsidy. This is because the EV mandate functions through manufacturer cross-
subsidization of EV vehicles from conventional vehicle margins. By making conventional vehicles 
more expensive, the EV mandate discourages greenhouse gas emissions from private transport.
The fuel economy standard is nearly as cost-effective as the straight gasoline tax and carbon tax 
at low levels of emission abatement, but rapidly becomes much less cost-effective as additional 
emissions abatement is pursued. This is because the fuel economy standard does not encourage 
substantial reductions in transport demand and does little to encourage decarbonization of fuels.10 
The model suggests that, on its own, the low carbon fuel standard is substantially less cost-
effective than the market-based policies that we simulate. As shown in Figure 3, to achieve a 9.1 
per cent reduction in annual emissions over about seven years as we will discuss later, the marginal 
abatement cost of the low carbon fuel standard is dramatically higher than a revenue-neutral carbon 
tax. One feature of the LCFS is that its marginal abatement cost curve includes small kinks where 
blending limits impinge on the ability of low carbon fuels to reduce emissions further. These are 
particularly relevant in the near-term scenarios that we examine, but may become less important 
over the longer term as new technologies allow greater integration of renewable fuels.
10 
The way we model the fuel economy standard is somewhat idealized in comparison to the real-world implementation of this 
policy. In particular, we don’t use size thresholds like the policy does in reality.
10
FIGURE 3
Marginal abatement curve for individual policies. The marginal abatement curves reflect a 
medium-run (roughly seven-year) time horizon.
 
Because the costs of policies we model are, not surprisingly, sensitive to model parameterization, 
we conducted a sensitivity analysis. The revenue-neutral carbon tax remains the most cost-effective 
of any of the individual regulatory options for the range of parameters considered (see the related 
working paper for details). We also observe that for the domain of our sensitivity analysis, the 
marginal abatement cost curves for the EV mandate and carbon tax do not shift dramatically in 
response to parameter changes, whereas the curve for the LCFS shifts markedly for some of the 
parameter changes. The key sensitivity parameters relate to the cost and emission intensity of 
renewable fuels.
Table 2 provides an overview of our findings for each instrument applied individually to reduce 
transport emissions by about 9.1 per cent11 over a roughly seven-year period. Carbon or fuel taxes 
have total cost at or below $27 per person per year, whereas the remaining instruments have 
progressively higher total costs.12 
11 
This translates to a reduction of about eight Mt a year.
12 
The sole exception is a revenue-neutral fuel tax which has similar costs to the revenue-neutral carbon tax.
11
TABLE 2 OVERVIEW OF SINGLE POLICIES
MAC Welfare ($ person) Stringency
Carbon Tax (Revenue Neutral) 130 -17 $175/t CO2e
Carbon Tax 176 -27 $175/t CO2e
Fuel Tax (Revenue Neutral) 156 -20 27 ¢/l
Fuel Tax 211 -32 27 ¢/l
LCFS 430 -62 10.1% reduction in GHG intensity of fuel
EV Mandate 1125 -181 11.2% of new cars are ZEVs
EV Subsidy 1185 -191 14.6% of new cars are ZEVs
Fuel Economy Regulation 233 -28 23.1% improvement in fuel economy
3.2 What Mix of Policies?
The prior section simulated a number of individual transport policies and showed that carbon taxes 
are able to reduce transport sector emissions at substantially lower cost than individual regulatory 
policies. In practice, however, policy-makers do not typically implement a single regulation to 
reduce emissions, but instead use a number of regulations concurrently. This is the approach taken 
by the Pan-Canadian Framework, which proposes a carbon price, clean fuel standard and electric 
vehicle strategy on top of previously implemented regulations governing the greenhouse gas 
intensity of new vehicles. In this section, we focus on (1) how to optimally choose this combination 
of policies – in particular the two policies currently being designed, and (2) the cost-effectiveness 
of the package of policies.
In each case, these policies are modelled as additional to what we will call our policy baseline. 
That includes the already committed carbon price benchmark of $50/t (in 2022) and fuel economy 
regulations tight enough to improve the fuel economy of the vehicle fleet by five per cent.13 In our 
model, these together are enough to reduce transport sector emissions by four per cent from the 
baseline (initial) values.14 
To simplify the issue, we focus specifically on an EV mandate as described earlier since most 
economic analyses favour the EV mandate over EV subsidies. We consider combinations of EV 
mandate and LCFS policies that achieve from one to 13 per cent further emission reductions from 
our policy baseline. This amounts to reductions from our benchmark case (before the reductions 
brought about by the carbon tax and fuel economy regulations) of 6.5 per cent to 18 per cent. 
We use our model to select the lowest cost combination of EV mandate and LCFS to achieve 
increasingly stringent transport emission reductions. The option of just using one or the other 
instrument is also considered.
13 
This value is intended to reflect added tightness to light duty fuel economy regulations attributable to fleet-wide average 
GHG intensity limits that were layered on pre-existing fuel economy regulations. See http://www.transportpolicy.net/
standard/canada-light-duty-fuel-consumption-and-ghg/ ?title=canada:_light-duty:_fuel_consumption_and_ghg.
14 
For simplicity, we do not model other policies that affect passenger transport, which have been applied by federal or 
provincial governments. One reason for the small reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from these and other policies that 
we simulate is that we focus on the medium-run (seven-year) reductions in emissions, when only about half the vehicle fleet 
has turned over.
12
FIGURE 4
Loss-minimizing combinations of EV target share and LCFS share. The label indicates percentage 
reduction in emissions, from one to 16 per cent beyond emission reductions induced by the carbon 
price and vehicle greenhouse gas intensity regulations. The EV target is the percentage of new 
vehicle sales required to be electric. The LCFS target is the percentage reduction in the greenhouse 
gas intensity of vehicle fuels required by the clean fuel standard.
 
Figure 4 shows combinations of EV target and LCFS share which minimize the total economic 
cost (foregone consumption) associated with our central case parameter configuration. The EV 
target defines the target share of EVs in new vehicle sales. A value of zero means that an EV 
mandate is not part of the loss-minimizing policy. Any positive value shows the ratio of new EV 
sales to total new vehicle sales. The LCFS target defines the required reduction in fuel full cycle 
greenhouse gas intensity under the clean fuel standard. The first point on the curve represents the 
policy combination for a target reduction of one per cent, with each subsequent point representing 
a further one per cent reduction (relative to the policy baseline). Each point is labelled with the 
percentage emission reduction associated with that policy combination. The end point represents 
the policy combination associated with a 16 per cent reduction of passenger road transportation 
emissions (relative to the policy baseline). For example, to reduce emissions by 10 per cent below 
the policy baseline, the optimal combination of policies would include a six per cent LCFS and a 
four per cent EV mandate.
Looking only at the marginal abatement cost curves of the individual policies would have 
suggested that the EV mandate would play no role in the optimal (loss-minimizing) policy mix. 
This turns out not to be the case in any of our parameter configurations. The specific case of our 
central case parameters is illustrated in Figure 5. While the marginal abatement cost curves of both 
the EV mandate and LCFS are above the carbon tax, the policy package including a combination of 
LCFS and EV mandate is always below either the EV mandate curve or the LCFS curve.
There are many interactions among these policy instruments. In the case of an LCFS and EV 
mandate, the LCFS will cause an increase in the price of fuel. Initially, the increase is modest, but 
as the LCFS target gets larger, the cost rises due in part to limitations posed by the existing stock 
13
of vehicles. As the cost of fuel goes up, it becomes easier to convince drivers to adopt EVs. The 
operation of the EV mandate also interacts with the LCFS. As the share of EVs rises it becomes 
less costly to comply with a given LCFS because the total quantity of higher cost renewable fuels is 
reduced as a smaller share of the fleet is composed of internal combustion vehicles.
FIGURE 5
Marginal Abatement Cost Curves: Selected Individual Policies and Recommended Policy Package. 
ctax_rn is the revenue-neutral carbon tax; evmandate is the electric vehicle mandate; lcfs is the 
low carbon fuel standard; policy package is the optimal combination of policy instruments as 
described in the text.
 
4. CONCLUSIONS
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from road transport is a key policy goal. Like most 
others, we find that the carbon tax has the lowest marginal abatement cost of all instruments, 
meaning that using a carbon tax on its own would minimize the social cost of a given emissions 
reduction goal. This is in part because the carbon tax gives appropriate incentives at all the relevant 
margins, whereas the other instruments do not.
Individual regulatory instruments, such as a low carbon fuel standard, zero emission vehicle 
mandate or fuel economy regulation, are costly to achieve substantial emission reductions. 
Nonetheless, when we simulate a combination of regulatory instruments – such as Canadian 
governments are currently considering – we find that it is possible for the cost-effectiveness of a 
regulatory approach to be substantially improved. This conclusion requires judicious choice of 
policies to combine. Our research suggests that a low carbon fuel standard plus a relatively weak 
zero emission vehicle mandate would be an appropriate policy combination in Canada, given other 
policy measures already committed to.
Our finding that a blend of LCFS and EV mandate lowers cost relative to using one alone arises in 
part because by using both instruments together, we exploit the low cost segments of each marginal 
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abatement cost curve. Because of our focus on the near term (about seven years) the LCFS 
marginal abatement cost curve eventually gets quite high as a result of the constraints imposed 
by the existing vehicle fleet, which for the most part is unable to use higher-ratio blends of some 
renewable fuels. Using both instruments results from more than just taking advantage of low cost 
portions of the marginal abatement cost curve, since the LCFS and EV mandate interact. As the 
share of EVs expands, the cost of satisfying a given LCFS standard falls, because less of the higher 
cost low carbon fuels need to be produced. Likewise, as the LCFS standard is raised, the cost of 
fuel for internal combustion cars rises, making it easier to convince drivers to purchase an EV.
There are many qualifications to our findings. As with any simulation study of this type, our results 
depend on a number of parameters, some of whose values are not estimated or on which there does 
not exist a consensus.15 We also do not address two additional issues relevant to policy choice. Our 
model also does not allow us to assess distributional impacts since we only have one representative 
consumer. A further consideration is the argument that support for EVs is about enabling a 
significant transition from fossil fuel-powered vehicles to electric vehicles. The argument is that 
providing adequate supports will give market incentives for better infrastructure (charging stations 
in particular). Finally, we do not represent the added benefits resulting from a move to more EVs, 
the reduction in local air pollutants. Moving to electric vehicles from even low carbon fuels is 
likely to reduce local air pollution further. The benefits from such local air quality improvements 
can easily outweigh the benefits from reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
15 
See the working paper for a sensitivity analysis around key parameters.
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